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Vietnam’s economy has been growing rapidly in recent years. It is assumed that Vietnam may 
be the fastest growing of Southeast Asia’s emerging economies by 2025. Vietnamese people’s 
income has improved significantly. As a result, there are a lot of new industry areas and ur-
ban, modern cities have been built in Vietnam. Nevertheless, the amount of middle class, 
which is the most important class in an economy, in Vietnam is also increasing. 
 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the role of economic reforms in Vietnam in the 
expansion of Vietnam’s middle class. In addition, the readers will learn more about Vietnam’s 
economy before and after economic reforms. They will also know how changes the reforms 
has made to Vietnamese people. 
 
The thesis is a literature review, it used economic data from the World Bank, Vietnamese 
government sites and other sources were analyzed. Various measures of economic develop-
ment were tested to achieve the results of this study. 
 
The evaluation of data collected indicates that despite the expanded efforts and planning 
under the Doi Moi reform in 1986, which have resulted in impressive growth of the country, 
there has not been a significant expansion of the middle class. The middle class is just im-
proving in big cities such as Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. There is a huge gap of income be-
tween people in urban areas and the ones who live in countryside. 
 
Based on the results, the recommendation for government are given. It also has some initial 
thoughts on the problems of defining and delimiting the middle orders of society as well as 
the reasons behind those problems which has been preventing Vietnam from becoming an ad-
vanced country, a country worth living such as Singapore and Malaysia. 
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 1 Introduction
 
Since the mid-1970s, following reunification, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) has re-
mained firmly in control. From the second half of the 1980s the Party began a program of 
economic renovation which called Doi Moi, to create a market economy within the socialist 
state and allowing for decollectivization, private ownership, and liberalized foreign trade and 
investment (Beresford2006; Drummond & Thomas 2003). Although Doi Moi was introduced in 
1986, it was not until the early 1990s when a combination of internal and external factors (for 
example, the promulgation of a new Law on Foreign Investment in 1987, the termination of 
aid and trade flows from the Eastern European bloc in 1989, and the conclusion of the Peace 
Accord with Cambodia in 1991), resulted in the acceleration of economic and structural re-
forms. Since Doi Moi, Vietnam’s economy has been a “market oriented socialist economy un-
der state guidance” that has become open to private sectors and foreign investors. Indeed, 
the economic reform has improved the state’s economy, decreasing inflation and poverty and 
increasing the GDP growth rates tremendously over the past 26 years. However, there are still 
remaining problems and unachieved goals, such as unclear laws, high societal inequality and 
state’s relatively high economic dominance. Thus, there has been much research that has 
analyzed the improvements and problems of Doi Moi. 
 
1.1 The Objective 
 
This study poses a new question towards Doi Moi: what are its effects on the expansion of Vi-
etnam’s middle class? The investigation is relevant because of the importance of the relation-
ship between the growth of an economy and the size of its middle class. Based upon several 
studies, which can date back to the time of Aristotle, it can be asserted that a strong middle 
class will lead to robust growth of the economy, as well as the progress lending towards de-
mocratization. Theoretically, a shift from an economy that was closed prior to 1986 to a cur-
rent world’s leading exporter in a number of products (rice, footwear, coffee, etc.) should 
lead to an enormous growth of the middle class. Yet, it is widely believed that Vietnam’s 
economy is not reaching its full potential and is having developmental issues. Therefore, my 
hypothesis is that Vietnam’s economic reform in 1986 has not had significant impacts on the 
expansion of Vietnam’s middle class. 
 
 
1.2 Limitations of Study 
 
The data mining process of this study is largely dependent on sources from the Vietnamese 
government. Due to political reasons, only limited data has been released. Therefore, the 
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data did not provide enough statistical evidence to conduct a regression model. In addition, 
the government provided data pertaining to Vietnam that is only accurate to a certain level.  
 
The study is delimited to the data of Vietnam’s economy from 1986 to 2012 only. 
 
1.3 Data 
 
Data of Vietnam’s economic indicators (GDP, GINI coefficients, income brackets, foreign in-
vestment, poverty rates, etc.) were acquired from three main online sources: the World Bank 
online database, the Vietnam General Statistic Office database (GSO) and the CIA World 
Factbook. The data were released by the Vietnamese government with a limited number of 
years included. Data from the GINI coefficients of China and India were also taken into con-
sideration. These data were also founded in the World Bank Database. 
 
1.4 Method of Research 
 
The economic development indicators (GDP, foreign investment, export, etc.) were used to 
demonstrate the significant improvements of Vietnam’s economy since 1986. The GINI coeffi-
cients and income brackets were used to determine the expansion of Vietnam’s middle class 
over years. In addition, considering the expansions of China’s and India’s middle classes, the 
GINI coefficients of the two countries were also utilized for comparison purposes. 
 
2 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Vietnamese Economic Reform in 1986 – ”Doi Moi” 
 
2.1.1 Vietnam’s situation before Doi Moi 
 
From 1954 to 1975, after Vietnam gained independence from the France, the country was 
divided into two regimes: North Vietnam and South Vietnam. North Vietnam was supported by 
the Soviet Union and followed communism while South Vietnam was supported by the United 
States and adopted capitalism. During this period of time, North and South Vietnam had diffe-
rent economic situations. In the North, farmers were required to “voluntarily” join cooperati-
ves and were assigned an amount of products to be produced. This led to corruption, abuse of 
power from the managers’ side and lack of incentive from the farmers’ side since the salaries 
would not be changed no matter how many hours they worked. As a result, rice production 
declined regardless of the government’s efforts to improve farming techniques and irrigation. 
(Le, D 2004 and Table 1) 
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Table 1. Rice production (thousand tons) 
Year Rice Output 
1955 3303 
1956 4127 
1957 3859 
1958 4454 
1959 5056 
1960 4177 
1961 4393 
1962 4388 
1963 4112 
1964 4424 
Sources: Tran Van Tho et al. Vietnam’s Economy 1955-1964. 
 
In 1957-1958 the North Vietnamese government in a campaign against private ownership took 
over most firms in manufactures and services, excluding micro businesses such as rickshaw 
drivers, small eateries serving traditional pho (noodle soup). Most of the takeovers by the 
state were expropriations whereby the state paid a lump sum to the previous owners. There 
new firms often started as state-private joint ventures but in 1964 most of these were trans-
formed into state-owned enterprises (SOEs), while some remained as state-private joint com-
panies. All agricultural farms in agriculture were transformed into cooperatives. Most of small 
handicraft and services were also reorganized as cooperatives (rickshaw drivers, small textile 
producers, etc.) operating within the framework of a centrally planning economy. 
 
As a basically agricultural economy, the collectivization campaigns had a negative impact on 
socio-economic development. The share of state ownership increased from 17.9% in 1957 to 
44.6% in 1965. The share of the cooperatives increased 0.2% to 45.4% in 1965, while the share 
of the private sector declined from 71.9% in 1957 to 10% in 1965 (Table 2). 
 
However, the socialization campaign in Vietnam was not conducted any further. Small private 
agricultural activities were allowed on 5% of the land for members of the cooperatives. This 
was one of the income sources for the members of the cooperatives. Also, the farmers could 
sell products from this 5% of land to the market and could earn 40% of their income in cash. 
The efficiency of this 5% land was much higher compared to the 95% collectively cultivated 
land of the cooperatives, and such fact worried government economists and policy makers. A 
system of state procurement of crops and meat at fixed prices caused de-facto losses for the 
farmers. The incentives system for the farmers was distorted. In the cities, small traders 
were morally condemned, administratively pursued, but they did not totally disappear since 
they still satisfied people’s demands in some extend, which were neglected by the centrally 
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planning and the rationing system. The supply system urban regions to fixed prices (lower 
than market price) on food and essential consumer goods caused artificially demand in a 
shortage economy, as people tried to buy as much as possible in the fear that the goods 
would not be available in the future. 
 
 
Table 2. North Vietnam’s economic structure before Doi Moi 
 Socialist sector Private, individ-
ual sector  Total State owned and 
state-capitalist 
Collectivized and 
cooperative 
1957 18.1 17.9 0.2 71.9 
1960 66.4 37.8 28.6 33.6 
1965 90.0 44.6 45.4 10.0 
1970 91.4 40.3 51.1 8.6 
1975 91.6 51.7 39.9 8.4 
Source: Tran Van Tho et al. Vietnam's Economy 1955-1975 
 
Table 3. Ownership restructure in Reunited Vietnam, 1976-1985 (%) 
 
Year State-owned sector Non-state sector 
1976 27.7  72.3 
1980 19.8 80.2 
1985 28.0 72.0 
1990 31.8 68.2 
1995 40.2 59.8 
Source: Tran Van Tho et al. Vietnam’s Economy 1955-2000 
 
Simultaneously, South Vietnam was supported by the United States and had an open-market 
economy. It was integrated into the international market and had a strong dominance in light 
industries and services. However, after unification the country on 30 April 1975, when the US 
armed forces were finally defeated, two major campaign of socialist reconstruction were 
launched in 1976 and 1978, respectively, in the South Vietnam. All private enterprises with a 
total of $800 million, were socialized (either though expropriation or confiscation). Thereby 
the share of state-owned sector steadily improved as shown in table 3. By the end of 1985, 
the socialist reconstruction of all Vietnam was declared to have been successfully completed. 
 
Private capitalist enterprises were considered illegal and anti-socialist. The central planning 
system did not allow the operation of any private enterprise outside of the planning system. 
No material was allocated, no credits were provided to private companies, if they existed. 
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Manual work was praised in contrast to intellectual activities and professional services that 
were seen as non-productive. In such systemic economic, social, political and moral context, 
the capitalist elements could not exist. The society was asked to work hard, restrain from 
consumption and endure economic hardship and shortage with the vision of a brighter and 
more prosperous future. (Claes Brundenius, Ricardo Torres Pérez. 2013. No More Free 
Lunch: Reflections on the Cuban Economic Reform Process and Challenges for Transformation) 
 
 
After the unification, Vietnam’s economy suffered serious stagnancy because of the non-
productive central planning system which caused very low labor productivities, unemploy-
ment and technological short falls. Along with the severe war destruction, living conditions 
were very difficult for the majority of the population. The people’s demands were not pro-
vided because of a national shortage of food, necessities and consumer goods. The state im-
plemented rations for each type of occupation (Table 4). Still, there was a decline of external 
assistance from the Soviet Union at the same time. 
 
Table 4. Food rations for monthly consumption in Vietnam (1963-1989) 
Categories Class of rations Meat (kg) Sugar (kg) 
Special A1 more than 7  more than 3.5  
Minister and equivalent A 6.0 3.0 
Vice - minister and equiva-
lent 
B 5.0 2.0 
General Director C1 3.0 1.5 
Dep. Gen. Director C 2.0 1.0 
Director D 1.0 0.5 
State employee E 0.3 0.25 
Special worker DB 2.5 0.75 
Hard worker I 1.5 0.75 
Worker II 1.2 0.5 
Light worker III 0.3 0.35 
Children under 6 years TR 0.3 0.5 
Children 7-16 TN 0.3 0.35 
Source: Dang Phong et al. ibid. 
 
In 1980, Vietnam only exported 10% of its domestic production. For 11 years, from 1977 to 
1988, there was only an annually 3.5% rise in exports. In the early 1980s, the economic situa-
tion urged the government to moderate the economic system, allowing state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs) to be minimally market-oriented. Unfortunately, these changes did not improve 
the economy, which worsened when the inflation rate rose to almost 500%. 
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Table 5. Average salary of a state employee  
Year Salary in US$ according to the ex-
change rate 
1981 17272.60 
1982 8.329.20 
1983 7283.60 
1984 5123.00 
1985 1388.10 
1986 4227.50 
1987 331.80 
1988 304.90 
1989 65.960 
1990 32.60 
1991 25.19 
Source: Tran Van Tho et al. Vietnam’s Economy 1955-2000 
 
2.1.2 Economic Reform Policies 
 
The critical economic situation made the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) introduce a more 
comprehensive economic renovation in its Sixth National Congress in December 1986.  This 
converted the economy to a “market-oriented socialist economy under state guidance.” The 
Doi Moi reform recognized the importance of multi-ownership structured economy, aiming at 
improving people’s living standards through more relaxing economic policies and reduction of 
government intervention in the market. The rationing system for commodities was abolished 
in 1987 and the market determined nearly all commodity prices in 1990. Doi Moi encouraged 
foreign investment and expansion of the private sector. Moreover, new laws (typically Enter-
prise’s Laws) were passed, making it easier for the private sector to develop and to attract 
more investments from other countries. (Klump & Bonschab. 2004) 
 
 
2.1.3 After Vietnam’s Economic Reform 1986 – Doi Moi 
 
Since the start of Doi Moi, Vietnam’s economy has experienced a period of astounding growth 
and development. The annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 7% in that period 
has made Vietnam became one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Even though 
the growth was slowed down somewhat during the Asian economic crisis in the late 1990s and 
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the SARS epidemic in the early 2000s, Vietnam’s economy still has a high growth rate (approx-
imately 5-6%). Better still, the inflation rate declined to 34.7% after Doi Moi in 1989. In 1992, 
exports accounted for almost 50% of the national GDP.  After 8 years, in 2000, the export dol-
lar value doubled the percentages of 1992. There has also been a rapid growth of joint ven-
tures, foreign investment, job creations and foreign invested firms. In 1988, the poverty rate 
for the entire population was 75%.  However, this number has fallen significantly to 56% in 
1993 and 30% in 2002. (Belanger, 2000). Based on 4 criteria: Life expectancy at birth, mean 
years of schooling, expected years of schooling and gross national income per capita, the 
United Nations measured and evaluated the Human Development Index (HDI) in Vietnam from 
1986 to 2000 (Table 6). HDI is used to measure and rank countries’ level of social and eco-
nomic development. 
 
In July 13, 2000, Vietnam and the United States signed the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA), 
which applied a reduction of trade tariffs on most imports from Vietnam. Based on data from 
the World Bank, the value of Vietnam’s exports rose to 1.3 billion dollars in 2001, which was 
60% higher than that of 2000. The BTA has boosted bilateral trade between Vietnam and the 
U.S. as well as trade with other western countries. 
 
From the start of the 21st century, Vietnam’s economy has taken a big step forward with sig-
nificant changes in various fields, especially in socio-economic development. In 2000, the 
amount of Official Development Assistant (ODA) in general and from Japan in particular in-
creased sharply.  Also, banks and financial groups were allowed to deal with interest rates 
themselves from 2002. In 2006, Vietnam successfully became the 150th member of the WTO, 
opening wide and various opportunities for both domestic and foreign companies. In 2008, the 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for Vietnam reached the level of $60 billion, which is the 
highest in its history. The GDP growth rate has been continuously high, between 5-7%.  
After 26 years since the Doi Moi, Vietnam’s economy has made a great step forward. The GDP 
in 2010 was $272.6 billion and the unemployment rate was 4.4%, which was relatively low 
compared to that of other countries because of the economic crisis. (World Bank database) 
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Table 6. Indicators of Growth and Development in Vietnam 1980 – 2001 
INDICATOR 1980-1986 1987-1991 1992-1997 1998-2001 
Average annual real GDP 
growth rates (%) 4.88 5.05 8.77 6.04 
Population growth (%) 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.8 
GDP per capita growth (%) 2.66 3.15 6.87 5 
Human Development Index 
(value) N/A 0.435 (1990) 0.486 (1995) 0.528 (2000) 
Source: World Bank database, UNDP database (2003) 
 
2.1.4 Challenges for Vietnam’s economy after Doi Moi 
 
Despite the tremendous growth and development of Vietnam’s economy since 1986, it is cat-
egorized as a low-income economy having a number of old and emerged problems. The mar-
ket-economic institutions are not yet fully established, especially when most of the biggest 
state-owned corporations have not been equitized and major industries are still owned by the 
state. There is large capital flow through ODA and FDI but the government has not used it ef-
ficiently. Having a large SOEs’ share in the economy but no clear and lawful regulations for 
SOEs makes the economy less incentive and productive. This can also be seen by the fact that 
the stock-exchange market is small and only accounts for 0.26% of the GDP. 
 
The national poverty rate has been on the decline, but not uniformly throughout the country. 
The urban areas near the Red River Delta and Mekong Delta have had a sharp decrease in 
poverty while other mountainous areas have been experiencing a much slower rate. In fact, 
many poor people live in the mountainous and rural areas. Also, education levels and working 
skills are different, which has created a gap between the rich and the poor. In addition, Vi-
etnam is going through industrialization and a lot of farmland is being used to build factories 
and provide for city expansion with foreign investment. Many farmers and workers in these 
areas are skillful only in their agricultural specialty and cannot find different jobs, thus in-
creasing the unemployment rate and inequality in the society. 
 
Apart from the economy, the political reform in Vietnam has been a slow process. Press and 
media are still under the control and regulation of state. News is subjected to a state censor 
before being released. There is a large censorship from the Department of Culture and Ideol-
ogy in TV shows, concerts, music, newspapers and several other forms of media. 
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2.2 The importance of Middle Class 
 
It has been accepted that there are mutual beneficial relationships between a country’s eco-
nomic growth, society stability and political environment. A strong middle class, as the larg-
est consumer group, is a stable consumer base that will boost the productive investment 
(money cycle) of an economy. A strong middle class can promote educational value, trust lev-
el among people and other societal conditions that ensure social stability. Moreover, being 
between two extreme classes, the rich and the poor, the middle class has the best-balanced 
interests that also benefit the society. A study in 2005 of economic growth in the 50 states by 
Dr. Mark Partridge of Ohio State University concluded “a more vibrant middle class…increased 
long-run economic growth”. (Madland, 2011) Within the following are four fundamental 
mechanisms that make the middle class the key of economic, society and political develop-
ment. 
 
2.2.1 Middle Class creates Stable Demand 
 
In his masterpiece, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money” in 1936, John 
Maynard Keynes demonstrated the fundamental connections between the middle class and 
economic growth. Keynes stated that there has to be a sufficient level of consumption to 
make profit and new investments beneficial. Hence, it is crucial for policy-makers to seek for 
demand stimulation during economic recessions. He also noted an important point that ex-
tremely unequal distributions of income lower demand, which leads to slower growth of the 
economy. The main reason is that the wealthy actually saves more money and spends less 
than the middle class, which means that there is not going to be enough demand to back up 
an economy in crisis. 
 
This can also be concluded by Keynes’ hypothesis about the relationship between Consump-
tion (C) and Income (Y), which is the Average Propensity to Consume (APC= ). Keynes said 
that as the incomes go up, people consume more and save more. Thus, for an economy to 
have sustainable robust growth, it is necessary for the middle class to have high income 
enough to consume goods. 
 
Keynes, John M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. p. 96. “The fundamental psychological law ... is that men [and 
women] are disposed, as a rule and on average, to increase their consumption as their income 
increases, but not as much as the increase in their income.” 
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2.2.2 Middle Class and Trust 
 
It is reasonable to assume that a strong middle class can increase the level of trust in a socie-
ty and among members of the same class. People would be more willing to work with others 
people who are from the same group. They would be more confident and optimistic to work 
and do business with others since the middle class size is big and their living standards are 
controllable. Apparently, the rich and the poor do not share a lot of the same moral values. 
Hence, in an unequal society, there will be a low level of trust, which can result in higher 
costs of transactions and making it more difficult to develop policies. (Madland, 2011) 
 
2.2.3 Middle Class and Good Gorvernance 
 
As far back as 350 B.C., Aristotle emphasized the importance of the middle class to the stabil-
ity of a country. The rich, who have wealth and fortunes, according to Aristotle, are generally 
not willing to submit to authority. In contrast, the poor are too degraded and weak that they 
are commonly ruled. Therefore, Aristotle believed that a middle class that acts as the moder-
ation and mean of the two extreme classes is much needed. The larger the middle class size 
is, the harder it would be divided into either group. This is the key point for promoting a 
country’s democracy. Aristotle’s idea is still applicable for the modern world because the 
middle class will advocate policies that are beneficial to the whole society but not some spe-
cific people. Because of being between the rich and the poor, the middle class wants to in-
crease their wealth, but also stabilize the economy to benefit the poor and themselves. 
Hence, a strong middle class will ensure the government is working well and promoting favor-
able policies for the economy to grow. (Madland, 2011) 
 
2.2.4 Middle Classes promote Capitalist’s Values 
 
The middle class has sufficient financial resources and stability, but not enough life of lei-
sure. Thus, there is a positive attitude of the middle class to gain more work and to work, 
causing the economy to become productive. Another noticeable idea is that, nowadays, the 
capitalist’s value has been passed down through generations that people are having higher 
expectations in lives. Generally, children are taught to work and study hard, get a college 
degree and to be successful. Hence, the middle class also promote the society in the long 
term (Madland, 2011.) 
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3 Theoretical concept and actual finding 
 
3.1 Income distribution 
 
Figure 1. GINI Coefficient 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To verify the income distribution, I used GINI index. The index is named after its developer, 
Corrado Gini, an Italian statistician of the early 20th century. It is typically expressed as a 
percentage, so a 20 coefficient would be shown as 20%. It measures the extent to which the 
distribution of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an 
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative 
percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting 
with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lo-
renz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the 
maximum area under the line. Thus a GINI index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an 
index of 100 implies perfect inequality. Do not mistake the measurement of income distribu-
tion with the measurement of wealth. A wealthy country and a poor country can have the 
same Gini coefficient, even if the wealthy country has a relatively equal distribution of afflu-
ent residents and the poor country has a relatively equal distribution of cash-strapped resi-
dents. 
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Hence, the first economic indicator to be investigated is the GINI coefficient, measuring the 
inequality of values for a frequency distribution. In this case, the GINI coefficient is of the 
income distribution of Vietnam from 1986 to 2012. GINI index will be 0 in the most equal so-
ciety (G=0). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. GINI index of Vietnam’s economy since 1992 
 
Year GINI index (G) 
1992 35.68 
1993 38 
1998 35.52 
2001 37.55 
2002 38 
2004 39.16 
2006 38 
2008 35.57 
2010 39.3 
2012 35.6 
  Source: World Bank database  
 
Chart 1. Vietnam GINI coefficient 
 
 
Based on Chart 1, it can be assumed that the inequality level of Vietnam’s income distribu-
tion has been fairly high but stable over 16 years. There was no sharp peak or trough, indicat-
ing that the gaps among different classes (income groups) remain almost the same. However, 
the GINI coefficient in this case is not enough to show if there has been any expansion of Vi-
etnam’s middle class.  
30,0035,00
40,00
1992 1993 1998 2001 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
GINI
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Chart 2. India GINI Index since 1983 
 
 
 
Chart 3: China GINI Index sine 1981 
 
 
Source: World Bank database 
 
By considering the cases of China and India, this study concluded that examining the GINI co-
efficient of income distribution alone couldn’t do measuring the size of the middle class. Over 
years, much of the Chinese and Indian population has move into the middle classes. However, 
there is no major decrease in the GINI indexes of these two countries over a long period of 
time. China’s GINI index has even increased a small amount. It is because the relatively pro-
portional increases in incomes of different groups, which results in approximately the same 
inequality levels over years. Hence, there might be increases in income of the different 
groups, expanding the size of middle classes. 
 
3.2 Poverty rate 
 
3.2.1  Statistical concept and methodology 
 
 
Poverty headcount ratio among the population is measured based on national (i.e. country-
specific) poverty lines. A country may have a unique national poverty line or separate poverty 
lines for rural and urban areas, or for different geographic areas to reflect differences in the 
00,2
0,40,6
1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005
CHINA GINI INDEX
GINI
0,30,35 1983 1988 1994 2005
INDIA GINI INDEX
GINI
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cost of living or sometimes to reflect differences in diets and consumption bas-
kets.(web.worldbank.org) 
 
A common method used to measure poverty is based on incomes or consumption levels. A per-
son is considered poor if his or her consumption or income level falls below some minimum 
level necessary to meet basic needs. This minimum level is usually called the "poverty line". 
What is necessary to satisfy basic needs varies across time and societies. Therefore, poverty 
lines vary in time and place, and each country uses lines which are appropriate to its level of 
development, societal norms and values. 
 
Information on consumption and income is obtained through sample surveys, with which 
households are asked to answer detailed questions on their spending habits and sources of 
income. Such surveys are conducted more or less regularly in most countries. These sample 
survey data collection methods are increasingly being complemented by participatory meth-
ods, where people are asked what their basic needs are and what poverty means for them. 
Interestingly, new research shows a high degree of concordance between poverty lines based 
on objective and subjective assessments of needs.(web.worldbank.org) 
 
 
National poverty lines are the benchmark for estimating poverty indicators that are consistent 
with the country's specific economic and social circumstances. National poverty lines reflect 
local perceptions of the level and composition of consumption or income needed to be non-
poor. The perceived boundary between poor and non-poor typically rises with the average 
income of a country and thus does not provide a uniform measure for comparing poverty rates 
across countries. While poverty rates at national poverty lines should not be used for compar-
ing poverty rates across countries, they are appropriate for guiding and monitoring the results 
of country-specific national poverty reduction strategies. Almost all national poverty lines are 
anchored to the cost of a food bundle - based on the prevailing national diet of the poor - 
that provides adequate nutrition for good health and normal activity, plus an allowance for 
nonfood spending. National poverty lines must be adjusted for inflation between survey years 
to remain constant in real terms and thus allow for meaningful comparisons of poverty over 
time. (web.worldback.org) 
 
3.2.2 Finding 
 
As mentioned in the literature review, the poverty rate of Vietnam has declined significantly 
since 1986. Theoretically, when the poverty rate drops down drastically, income levels of all 
classes should be increased. Hence, there should be a significant percentage of people mov-
ing from the lower class to the middle class.  Table 8 shows a decline of 65% in the poverty 
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rate over 20 years, which indicates an improvement in income of the Vietnamese people. But 
the poverty increased about 3% from 2008 to 2012. It was likely caused of global financial cri-
sis 2007-2010, which leaded to the shut down of large numbers of businesses and tons of un-
employment. 
 
Table 8. Vietnam’s Poverty Rate from 1988-2012 
 
Year 1988 1993 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Poverty rate (%) 75 56 37 29 20 16 15 20.7 17.2 
Source: WorldBank Database 
 
3.3 Income brackets 
 
Income bracket is a category of taxpayers based on the amount of their income. To get the 
most accurate measurement of Vietnam’s middle class expansion after Doi Moi in 1986, the 
income brackets were assessed, using available data from 1986 to 2012. Table 9 shows the 
monthly income of five income groups in Vietnam, in which each group accounts for 20% of 
the population. Group 1 is the poorest group and Group 5 is the richest group. It was assumed 
that the middle class would be Group 3 and 4. 
 
On the surface, the poverty reduction policies from Vietnamese government look successful. 
Poverty levels in Vietnam have dropped from around 70 percent of the population to less than 
20 percent in the past 15 years, according to the World Bank. The country's economy grew by 
8 percent in 2006, and average per capita income has increased to $723 in 2006 from $485 in 
2003. But table 9 found that the wealthiest individuals earned almost 10 times more than the 
poorest, who mostly live in rural, remote areas and depend on agricultural production. A dis-
proportionate number of the poor also belong to ethnic minorities. Vietnam introduced fees 
for both health care and education in the late 1980s, adding that these policies have particu-
larly penalized women in rural areas. Families that don't have the money to pay for school 
fees and supplies are more likely to take girls out of school than boys. Health care costs have 
rocketed beyond the reach of poorest families and women tend to sacrifice their own health 
needs to allow their children and husbands to receive services, she added. Vietnam's govern-
ment remains intolerant of criticism; Human Rights Watch's 2007 World Report finds. In the 
past year it has persecuted dissidents, restricted public gatherings, controlled access to the 
Internet and prohibited all free press and independent labor unions. Vietnam wants to open 
up economically, but the ruling Communist Party also wants to keep political control.( Bojana 
Stoparic, Women's e-news, February 15, 2007) 
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Table 9. Monthly Incomes of Five Income Groups (USD1) 
Source: Vietnam Government Statistic Office database (GSO) 
 
 
Table 10. Percentage of Changes in Monthly Incomes of Five Income Groups (%) 
 
An important note for analyzing Table 10 is that in 2008, the inflation rate of Vietnam’s 
economy was approximately 22.3%. This explains the increases in incomes of all five groups. 
 
 
Chart 4. Percentage of Changes in Monthly Incomes 
 
 
 
Apparently, Table 10 and Chart 4 illustrate very minor differences between the changes of 
the income brackets, especially group 3 and group 4, over every two years after 2002.  Along 
with an almost horizontal line of Vietnam’s GINI index from 1992 to 2008, it is safe to assume 
                                                 
1 Current exchange rate: US$ 1 = 21 VND 
020
4060
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Changes in Monthly Income (%) 
Group 3Group 4
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Group 1 5 6.7 8.7 13 17.5 
Group 2 8.5 11.46 15 22.7 31.8 
Group 3 12 16.5 21.8 33.3 47 
Group 4 17.6 24.4 32.3 50 70 
Group 5 41.5 56.3 73 117 162 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Group 1 0 32 29 50 34 
Group 2 0 35 32 49 39 
Group 3 0 38 32 52 42 
Group 4 0 39 32 57 39 
Group 5 0 35 30 59 39 
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that the middle class of Vietnam has not had any major changes since Vietnam’s Economic 
Reform Doi Moi in 1986. Therefore, it is failed to reject the hypothesis. 
 
Some similarities between the Kuznets Curve and this research were also found (Figure 2). 
Simon Kuznets discovered the inverted U-shaped relationship between income inequality and 
economic growth (Kuznets 1955). The first half of the inverted U-shaped graph corresponds to 
developing economies like Vietnam. As the income increases, the income inequality plateaus 
to a turning point of Income. The other half is of developed countries, of which as the income 
goes up, income inequality will decrease. The curve cannot be constructed in this study be-
cause there is not enough number of years have passed since Doi Moi that allows construction 
of the curve. However, it can be concluded that Vietnam is still in the first part of the curve 
for developing countries and the middle class still needs to expand. 
 
 
Figure 2. 
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4 Vietnamese living standard in reality  
 
This is an example of a person who is considered as midde-class in Vietnam nowadays (actual-
ly a low class based on international rate), which was reported from Da Lat (a city in the 
middle of Vietnam), Stanley Karnow wrote in Smithsonian magazine, ”Peasants labored in 
paddy fields, protected at intervals by gleaming white statues of Phat Ba Quan Am, a Bud-
dhist goddess of compassion. I stopped at a flower farm, where the owner, in his mid-40s, 
identified himself as Le Mai Xuan. As we strolled around the meticulous, one-acre plot, he 
told me that he cultivates chrysanthemums that wholesale for 7 or 8 cents each. He moon-
lights as a policeman. His wife, Thuy, is a teacher; together they earn $14,000 annually—a 
staggering sum compared with the Vietnamese average of about $500. Despite their wealth, 
however, they and their three children share a minuscule house with outdoor plumbing. The 
family cooks on a primitive charcoal stove, but they have a radio, television set, videocas-
sette recorder and refrigerator. Their teenage son Hung sat at a makeshift desk in a corner, 
learning English on a computer. Logging onto the Internet, he demonstrated a vocabulary les-
son, repeating the words on the monitor: “Bob and Jane are staying with their Uncle George 
in Pittsburgh.” Beaming with pride, his father told me, “My dream is that he becomes an en-
gineer, a doctor or a lawyer, and cares for me when I retire.” I wished the youngster good 
luck.” (Stanley Karnow, Smithsonian magazine, August 2005). 
 
In my knowledge, more than 70 percent of the 83 million Vietnamese live in the countryside 
and work in agriculture, in some places still struggling to make one dollar a day. Even in Ha-
noi, where top classes are living, I have seen hardy women in conical straw hats are still seen 
walking all over the city balancing two heavy baskets of cheap fruit and vegetables from a 
pole hoisted on a shoulder. 
 
Vietnam is one of the most expensive places in the world to buy a vehicle with import tariffs 
of up to 90 percent. "You are first-class citizens if you go to work in a car," Do Thanh Trung, 
manager of a small import-export firm, said proudly after spending $29,000 on a second-hand 
Mercedes C200. 
 
 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
5.1 Discussion 
 
One of the consequences of Doi Moi in Vietnam has been increasing social inequality and par-
ticularly the widening gap between rich and poor, and urban and rural communities (World 
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Bank 1995, 1999, 2000; Beresford & McFarlane 1995; Luong & Unger 1998; Taylor 2004b). As 
the state abolished the subsidy system (bao cap), which used to provide for everything from 
education and employment to healthcare, housing, holidays and other social benefits, unem-
ployment and poverty have risen significantly. Meanwhile, there is ample evidence of dynam-
ic groups and individuals who possess knowledge, skills, experience, and social connections, 
seizing opportunities offered by economic development to become affluent, causing a widen-
ing disparity between rich and poor (Kim 2004). 
 
Therefore, there has emerged “the new urban rich” comprising people in positions of political 
power and administrative influence, those who control economic capital, and people with 
education, experience, and skills (Trinh Duy Luan 1993; Bresnan 1997: 77). These groupings 
can often overlap, as Koh, for example, observes in that most government officials have 
sources of income other than their official salary and many have subsequently accumulated 
economic capital (2001b: 283). It is the educated grouping which is most relevant to the study 
of middle classes. Increasingly urban professionals see themselves as successful in utilizing 
human capital instead of political power; and in so doing, bringing to Vietnam a ‘new ethos of 
transnational modernity’ (Taylor 2004b: 16). Jørgensen (2005: 318) has also noted that eco-
nomic renovation has ‘had a tremendous effect on social development and an urban middle 
class [has] emerged with a lifestyle closer to the global urban middle class than to their fel-
low citizens in the countryside’ (see also Earl 2004; Taylor 2004a, 2004b: 31–32). 
 
In this connection, the characterization of a communist party cadre in big cities such as Ho 
Chi Minh City and Hanoi, the middle class are referred to as ‘those who are well-educated and 
have a big monthly income, ... they have property, know at least one foreign language and 
can use the Internet. They may have a house or villa in the suburbs or neighboring provinces. 
As they have a car, their house must have a garage’ (quoted in Escobar 2003). In Vietnam, 
those people are considered as top classes. They are usually businessman or working for for-
eign enterprises. In state-owner organizations, only people on top positions among to this 
class. Normal employees in state companies they go to work by motorbikes or public transpor-
tations. In this paper I considered them as lower class. Besides, more people from countryside 
are trying to migrate in cities with the hope of changing their life. They have to face with 
more expensive expenditure and not guaranteed for a decent job, since there are so many 
competitive from other people. Minor of them have been successful and become middle class 
but the rest keep working with hope then it increases the amount of people in lower-class. 
The consequence would be the gap between the classes in Vietnam would more likely be big-
ger. 
 
Immediately after Doi Moi was introduced and throughout the 1990s, there was a relatively 
large movement of personnel from the state to the non-state sector (Fforde 1996: 40–41, 
 24 
2003: 41, 46; Boothroyd & Pham 2000: 23). It is estimated that more than 70% of those who 
left the state sector either created their own enterprises or were employed by business  
owners (Le & Rondinelli 1993: 9). However, growth in the private sector has been heavily 
concentrated in large cities, with Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City providing home to 40% of all 
Vietnamese private companies (Tenev et al. 2003; Hansen et al. 2004; Steer & Taussig 2002). 
In addition, in spite of this increase, the state is still a major employer, providing a greater 
number of jobs than any other single sector (Nguyen 2002). Private sector businesses are also 
‘still very reliant on the state for licenses, contracts, access to capital and land, and very of-
ten, protection' (Gainsborough 2002: 700; Fforde 2003: 37). At the provincial level 'not only 
are state institutions at the heart of regulating economic activity but also they are active par-
ticipants in economic activity through the running of state and private firms' (Gainsborough 
2005a: 11). Furthermore, 'relations between the equitized firm and the state continued to be 
close, with the state maintaining considerable inspection and control rights' (Gainsborough 
2005b: 33).  
 
The Doi Moi economic reform has had significant impacts on Vietnam’s economic growth. Be-
fore Doi Moi, Vietnam was a closed-economy with a 500% inflation rate and serious shortage 
of foods and necessities. Today, Vietnam is of the largest exporters of agricultural products 
with a relatively high annual GDP growth rate of 5-6%. In addition to abolishing the central 
planning system, the Vietnamese government has shown appreciation toward the private sec-
tor and especially foreign investment by easing the administrative procedures and passing 
more specific business related laws. Despite these favorable changes, an expected expansion 
of Vietnam’s middle class has not yet materialized, which is a bad sign for an economy and 
the democracy in the country. In the study titled “Political Change in Vietnam”, Gainsborough 
(2002) stated several interesting points that could explain the situation in Vietnam. One is 
that the level of democracy not only depends on the size of the middle class but also the re-
lations of the private sector/middle class and of the state. For example, enterprises and es-
pecially foreign companies are still largely dependent on the state for administrative proce-
dures or a background with Communist Party of Vietnam’s membership can be much more 
competitive to employers, especially to the conservative ones. 
 
5.2 Challenges for leaders 
 
Obviously, the government have to cut out the poverty and expand the middle class. The first 
step is creating more jobs. The best pathway out of poverty is a well-paying job. They should 
invest in job-creation strategies such as rebuilding infrastructure, developing renewable en-
ergy source, renovating abandoned house and construction. Alongside with offering more 
jobs, the education in rural areas has to leveled up. Rapid economic transformation and 
growth have meanwhile contributed to rising inequality in income and opportunities. Some of 
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the poor, especially those living in rural areas or small cities, have limited access to high 
quality education and health services, or to good jobs. 
 
The second step should be raising the working conditions, especially in state sector. Democ-
racy is always existed in Vietnamese state companies. Some people they do not do much but 
still get same or higher paid than others who are hard-working. Everyone should be treated 
fair. Besides, in order to get promoted, skills and levels are not the most important thing. 
You will not be promoted if you do not have a good relationship with your boss and col-
leagues. This kind of relationship is built by gifts, money, not by your working performance. 
The minimum wages also need to be raised. The huge salary gap between boss and lower 
people should be narrowed. 
 
The last but not least, private enterprises need to be allowed to involve and independent 
more in businesses, especially some sectors which are monopolized by government such as 
electricity, fuel, water, etc. It would just be better for consumers because they would have 
more options. Therefore the suppliers have to provide more quality products with reasonable 
price. 
 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
Even though the Doi Moi economic reform has impressively fueled the growth of Vietnam’s 
economy, the non-expanding middle class situation of the past 26 years should be seriously 
considered by the Vietnamese government. As stated in the literature review, the middle 
class has essential roles in stabilizing the economy and promoting democracy. Having a high 
GDP annual growth rate or being a large exporter does not guarantee a stable and rising 
economy if the social inequality is high. As mentioned in Aristotle’s “Politics”, when the mid-
dle class is small, a country’s population will fall into almost only two extreme classes: the 
rich and the poor, which could lead to social conflict. Even with the favorable economic con-
ditions after Doi Moi, the fact that Vietnam’s middle class size has not grown can be attribut-
ed to the State’s development policies that highly favor the rich, especially when state offi-
cials and employees account for a large part of Vietnam’s upper class. Apart from all the pos-
itive economic indicators of Vietnam’s economy, its government should carefully look into the 
middle class as well as poverty to have a long-term stable and advanced economy. 
 
5.4 Recommendation for future studies 
 
A suggested future study is to conduct the same study but with more data to determine if 
there is any expansion of the middle class in a wider range of time. It is crucial to maintain 
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and extend the size of the middle class for an economy. Therefore, future studies should look 
into the reasons of this non-expanding situation of Vietnam’s middle class. Also, suggestions 
to policy-makers would be very valuable for the development of Vietnam’s economy. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Rice production (thousand tons) 
Year Rice Output 
1955 3303 
1956 4127 
1957 3859 
1958 4454 
1959 5056 
1960 4177 
1961 4393 
1962 4388 
1963 4112 
1964 4424 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. North Vietnam’s economic structure before Doi Moi 
 Socialist sector Private, individ-
ual sector  Total State owned and 
state-capitalist 
Collectivized and 
cooperative 
1957 18.1 17.9 0.2 71.9 
1960 66.4 37.8 28.6 33.6 
1965 90.0 44.6 45.4 10.0 
1970 91.4 40.3 51.1 8.6 
1975 91.6 51.7 39.9 8.4 
 
 
Table 3. Ownership restructure in Reunited Vietnam, 1976-1985 (%) 
 
Year State-owned sector Non-state sector 
1976 27.7  72.3 
1980 19.8 80.2 
1985 28.0 72.0 
1990 31.8 68.2 
1995 40.2 59.8 
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Table 4. Food rations for monthly consumption in Vietnam (1963-1989) 
Categories Class of rations Meat (kg) Sugar (kg) 
Special A1 more than 7  more than 3.5  
Minister and equivalent A 6.0 3.0 
Vice - minister and equiva-
lent 
B 5.0 2.0 
General Director C1 3.0 1.5 
Dep. Gen. Director C 2.0 1.0 
Director D 1.0 0.5 
State employee E 0.3 0.25 
Special worker DB 2.5 0.75 
Hard worker I 1.5 0.75 
Worker II 1.2 0.5 
Light worker III 0.3 0.35 
Children under 6 years TR 0.3 0.5 
Children 7-16 TN 0.3 0.35 
 
 
 
Table 5. Average salary of a state employee  
Year Salary in US$ according to the ex-
change rate 
1981 17272.60 
1982 8.329.20 
1983 7283.60 
1984 5123.00 
1985 1388.10 
1986 4227.50 
1987 331.80 
1988 304.90 
1989 65.960 
1990 32.60 
1991 25.19 
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Table 6. Indicators of Growth and Development in Vietnam 1980 – 2001 
INDICATOR 1980-1986 1987-1991 1992-1997 1998-2001 
Average annual real GDP 
growth rates (%) 4.88 5.05 8.77 6.04 
Population growth (%) 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.8 
GDP per capita growth (%) 2.66 3.15 6.87 5 
HDI (value) N/A 0.435 (1990) 0.486 (1995) 0.528 (2000) 
 
 
 
Table 7. GINI index of Vietnam’s economy since 1986 
 
Year GINI index (G) 
1992 0.3568 
1993 0.38 
1998 0.3552 
2001 0.3755 
2002 0.38 
2004 0.3916 
2006 0.38 
2008 0.3557 
 
 
 
Table 8. Vietnam’s Poverty Rate from 1988-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 1988 1993 1998 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Poverty rate (%) 75 56 37 29 20 16 15 
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Table 9. Monthly Incomes of Five Income Groups (VND2) 
 
 
 
Table 10. Percentage of Changes in Monthly Incomes of Five Income Groups (%) 
                                                 
2 Current exchange rate: US$ 1 = 21 VND 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Group 1 107.7 141.8 184.3 275.0 369.4 
Group 2 178.3 240.7 318.9 477.2 668.8 
Group 3 251.0 347.0 458.9 699.9 1000.4 
Group 4 370.5 514.2 678.6 1067.4 1490.1 
Group 5 872.9 1182.3 1541.7 2458.2 3411.2 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
Group 1 0 32 29 50 34 
Group 2 0 35 32 49 39 
Group 3 0 38 32 52 42 
Group 4 0 39 32 57 39 
Group 5 0 35 30 59 39 
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Charts 
 
Chart 1. Vietnam GINI coefficient 
 
 
 
Chart 2. India GINI Index since 1983 
 
Chart 3: China GINI Index sine 1981 
 
 
Chart 4. Percentage of Changes in Monthly Incomes 
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